U.S. to Supply Saudi Arabia With a Restricted F-35 Variant — What That Means for the Region

Image credit : Gemini AI

The United States has signaled that any F-35 Lightning II jets sold to Saudi Arabia will be deliberately less capable than the bespoke variants flown by Israel — a compromise intended to advance a high-stakes diplomatic and defense agreement while preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge. The move follows fast-moving diplomatic talks in Washington and cleared procedural steps inside the Pentagon, and it comes with a string of caveats: limitations on weapons integration, software baselines and certain sensors are expected to be applied to the Saudi aircraft.

The announcement — which coincided with a high-profile visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — has already provoked intense debate in Washington, Jerusalem and Riyadh. Lawmakers, Israeli defense officials and U.S. intelligence experts have raised alarms about technology security, transfer risks to China, and the impact on regional military balances. U.S. officials say the planes offered to Riyadh will exclude some of the most sensitive Israeli modifications and the very latest integrations, reflecting legal and strategic safeguards intended to protect allied capabilities.

What Washington is offering — and what it is withholding

U.S. defense sources and reporting indicate the Saudi jets will be standard F-35As with restrictions, rather than Israel’s highly modified F-35I “Adir.” That means Riyadh is unlikely to receive unique Israeli upgrades such as bespoke electronic warfare suites or the full set of third-party integrations Israel enjoys. Reports also suggest Washington will withhold the latest advanced munitions — notably the cutting-edge AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile — which analysts say will likely remain exclusive to Israeli forces for the foreseeable future.

Officials frame these constraints as routine customization — the U.S. has long tailored F-35 configurations to specific partners — but critics say the deal still represents a major policy shift, granting one of the Gulf’s most powerful militaries access to stealth fighters for the first time. U.S. defense leaders insist the measures are designed to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” a concept enshrined in U.S. law that aims to ensure Israel retains superiority in critical technologies.

Why the sale matters: diplomacy, deterrence and money

For Riyadh, acquiring F-35s is a long-sought capability that would modernize the Royal Saudi Air Force and deepen Saudi–U.S. defense ties — part of a larger package of deals announced during senior talks in Washington. For the U.S., the sale is both a diplomatic prize and an economic windfall for the defense sector, and it signals a strategic pivot toward formalizing closer ties with Saudi Arabia after years of mistrust and human-rights controversies.

For Israel, however, the sale touches a political and existential nerve: Jerusalem has lobbied vigorously to ensure any Saudi acquisition does not erode its operational edge. Israeli officials fear that, over time, new capabilities could diminish the operational distance between the two air forces if safeguards are inadequate. U.S. assurances of downgraded capability aim to defuse that concern, but Israeli skepticism remains — especially in political circles closely watching congressional oversight.

Security concerns: China, technology transfer and intel risk

A central worry cited in U.S. intelligence reporting is Beijing’s expanding influence and technical reach. Some U.S. assessments warn that closer Saudi ties with China — including investments and procurement agreements — could create pathways for sensitive technology or know-how to be exposed, intentionally or indirectly. That fear partly explains the tighter limits on the capabilities offered to Riyadh and the emphasis on robust safeguards in any export license.

Analysts also note that complex supply chains and global maintenance networks could present vulnerabilities: modern combat jets require foreign nationals and third-party vendors for sustainment, and each link in the logistics chain is a potential point of access. U.S. policymakers say they will structure agreements, personnel vetting and industrial relationships to limit such exposure — and they will condition exports on enforceable safeguards and end-use monitoring.

Congressional politics and allied reaction

Even with executive-level momentum around the deal, the sale faces institutional checks. U.S. legislation requires notification to Congress and provides lawmakers an opportunity to review or object — and several members have flagged human-rights issues, technology-security concerns and the geopolitical effects on Israel. Congressional vetting could produce amendments, limits or politically charged hearings that shape the final package.

Across the Atlantic, allied reactions have been mixed. Some NATO partners see the sale as reinforcing regional stability by bolstering a Sunni ally’s deterrence against Iran. Others remain wary of how new capabilities will ripple through an already complicated Middle Eastern security landscape. Israel, meanwhile, is engaged in direct diplomacy to press for guarantees that preserve its operational lead and deny any single state access to the most sensitive F-35 features.

Operational realities: numbers, timelines and capability gaps

Reports suggest Saudi Arabia may seek up to 48 F-35s in initial orders, with deliveries likely phased over several years. Yet even with a multi-squadron buy, analysts point out that Israel’s experience operating and upgrading its fleet — coupled with unique hardware and software integrations — will probably sustain a practical edge for years to come. Moreover, the U.S. can control software updates and weapons integrations remotely, making capability transfer gradual and conditional.

Implementing downgrades is not just a matter of paperwork; it requires specific hardware locks, software baselines, and limitations on weapons certification. U.S. officials say these technical measures are well within established export-control practices and that similar customizations have been applied in other foreign military sales. The question remains whether those measures are enough to reassure anxious partners and skeptical observers.

What to watch next

1. Congressional review — Will lawmakers impose additional conditions or block parts of the sale?

   
   

2. Israel’s formal response — Will Jerusalem demand further guarantees, or seek enhanced compensation or cooperation?

   
   

3. Technical safeguards — How strictly will the U.S. define and enforce the “less advanced” baseline?

   
   

4. Saudi-China ties — Will Riyadh’s relationship with Beijing change the calculus of future technology transfers?

   
   

5. Regional balancing — Could other Gulf states accelerate purchases to maintain relative parity?